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United States v. Gecas: An Individual Right to the Fifth
Amendment for Those who Fear Foreign
Prosecution
I. Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the capture and prosecution of
alleged Nazi war criminals has been a continuing objective of many of
the world's governments.' In the United States, the Office of Special
Investigations (OSI), an arm of the Criminal Division of the Depart-
ment ofJustice, was formed specifically to investigate and institute legal
proceedings against suspected Nazi war criminals.' The process of
bringing these suspected criminals to justice has been fraught with
complications and unresolved issues. One of these, the question of
when and whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination can be invoked when a person fears only foreign
prosecution, was addressed recently by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Gecas.' In Gecas, the Eleventh Circuit
answered a constitutional question as yet unresolved by the Supreme
Court: whether a witness who fears foreign prosecution may avoid
testifying by invoking the Fifth Amendment' privilege against self-
incrimination.' Although this case involved a suspected Nazi war
criminal, the repercussions of the Eleventh Circuit's decision may be
felt by any person, regardless of nationality, who fears foreign
prosecution and wishes to invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination.6
The issue faced by the Gecas court has been largely by-passed both
in the Supreme Court and in other circuit courts.7 A two-part test has
I See, e.g., United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549, 1554 (1lth Cir. 1995) (referring to
criminal provisions in Lithuania, Israel and Germany which provide for the punishment of
Nazi war criminals).
2 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1551 n.1. Since the OSI's formation in 1979, the citizenship or
resident status of fifty suspected Nazi persecutors has been withdrawn. Sharon Cohen, Nazi
Hunters Busy as EverFiy Years Later, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 20, 1995, at 41. Of those,
forty-two have left the United States, three of whom were extradited. Id. There are twenty
cases pending in court and the OSI has 333 people under investigation. In addition, there
are 60,000 names on a "watch list" of those suspected of Nazi involvement. Id.
3 50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1995).
4 The Fifth Amendment reads in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1551.
6 Although some aspects of the court's holding are unique to suspected Nazi war
criminals, the holding was not limited to alleged persecutors and so could apply to anyone
wishing to invoke the privilege for fear of foreign prosecution. Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1549-65.
7 See, e.g., Zicarelli v. NewJersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972)
(passing on the Fifth Amendment question after finding that the witness did not face a real
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developed from the Supreme Court's decision in Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Commission of Investigation8 in which the Court noted that "[i] t is
well established that the privilege protects against real dangers, not
remote and speculative possibilities."9 After finding that the defen-
dant in Zicarelli did not face a real and substantial danger of foreign
prosecution, the Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional
issue.'" Using the Zicarelli opinion as a basis to develop a two-step
test, many courts have been able to end their analysis at the first step
and avoid the constitutional issue."
The first of the two steps requires that the court determine
whether a witness's fear of foreign prosecution is real and substan-
tial. 2 This step has two components: (1) whether the matters under
investigation might tend to incriminate the witness under foreign law;
and (2) whether there is a real and substantial danger of prosecution
under the foreign law if the witness is compelled to testify. If the court
finds that both components of the first step are met, it must then take
the second fundamental step of determining the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege of self-incrimination. 13
After finding that Gecas had a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution,' 4 the court of appeals addressed the constitutional issue
by examining both the precedent and the policies behind the
privilege. 5 In so doing, the court was also able to focus on whether
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was a
"personal right" or simply a "limited restraint targeted at particular
abuses of the government's power." 6  Based on its analysis of the
somewhat contradictory precedent in light of the policies and purposes
and substantial fear of foreign prosecution); United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding immunity sufficiently protected a witness from fear of prosecution and
therefore the question of the Fifth Amendment's scope was extraneous); United States v.
Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982) (leaving question of Fifth Amendment application to
foreign prosecution unanswered after finding witness had no real and substantial fear).
8 ZicareU, 406 U.S. at 478-79.
9 Id. at 478; see Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917); Heike v. United States,
227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1896).
10 ZicareUi, 406 U.S. at 480-81. The Court found that Zicarelli could answer the
allegedly incriminating questions without disclosing any facts that would subject him to
foreign prosecution. Ie. at 481. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Zicarelli, see infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
1I See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
12 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553. The Gecas court took the vague words of the Supreme Court
in Zicarelli and fashioned a concrete two-part test based on the requirement of establishing
a real and substantial fear. Id. (citing Zicarei, 406 U.S. at 478-80). The court also noted that
this is essentially the same test that is required to assert the privilege for a fear of domestic
prosecution. Id. at 1554 (citing. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
13 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553.
14 Id. at 1562.
15 Id. at 1562-65.
16 United States v. Gecas, 830 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Fla. 1993), affid in part, rev'd in part,
50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter Gecas 1).
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behind the privilege, the Gecas court held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was an individual right that can be
invoked by those who have a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution. 17
• Part II of this Note will examine the facts, procedural history, and
holding in the Gecas case. 8 Part III will focus on the background law
applicable to this -case and the policies behind the Fifth Amend-
ment.19 Part IV will analyze the effect of the case in light of the prior
decisions of both the Supreme Court and the other circuit courts.20
Finally, in Part V, the Note concludes that the court's ruling in Gecas,
although significant for its illumination of several factors which might
warrant further exploration in future cases, continues, like most of the
background law, to have flaws.2' These flaws will leave lower courts,
yet again, without a concrete rule to apply to those seeking to invoke
the Fifth Amendment when they fear foreign prosecution.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In 1962, Vytautas Gecas, a Lithuanian national, immigrated to the
United States.22 On his application for an immigrant visa, Gecas
stated that during the years 1938 through 1944 he was a pupil in
Lithuania.3 This answer allowed him to enter the United States as a
resident alien.24 Almost thirty years later, after the fall of the Soviet
Union, archives in the former republics were opened, revealing
documents and records pertaining to the Nazis during World War
17 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1567.
18 See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 60-140 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 141-99 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
2 Gecas I, 830 F. Supp. at 1405.
23 Id.
24 Id. In order to enter the United States as a resident alien, and subsequently to be
granted citizenship, an individual must sign a statement swearing that, inter alia, he is not a
member of an excludable class of aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1988). Any misrepresentation
within these statements is grounds for denaturalization. Id. § 1182(a) (6) (C) (i) (1994). The
OSI alleged that Gecas was a member of an excludable class under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (3) (E) (i) which excludes in part:
Any alien who.., under the direction of, or in association with.., any government
in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of Germany ..
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i)(1994). For a further discussion on the naturalization and
denaturalization of Nazi war criminals, see Theresa M. Beiner, Comment, Due Process for All?
Due Process, the Eighth Amendment and Nazi War Criminals, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293
(1989).
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11.25 From the evidence in those documents, the OSI apparently
found information indicating that Gecas had lied on his immigration
application and actually had been a Nazi collaborator during the
war.26  If true, these allegations would have prevented Gecas from
entering the United States. 27
In 1991, the OSI issued a subpoena to Gecas demanding that he
appear before an administrative panel to give testimony and produce
documents relating to his immigration to the United States and to his
activities during World War 11.2' Gecas appeared at the hearing and
gave his name and current and former addresses. 29 He then an-
swered all questions regarding his background and activities during the
war by stating, "I refuse to answer on the grounds that the answer
might tend to incriminate me." 0
B. The District Court
At the district court level, Gecas argued that the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution protected him from compelled self-
incrimination that could expose him to criminal prosecution in a
foreign country. 1  The court noted that in order to reach the
constitutional question the witness must show a "real and substantial"
fear of foreign prosecution.32 Despite finding that Gecas did have a
real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, the court held that the
Fifth Amendment did not protect witnesses from being compelled to
give testimony when their only danger of incrimination would be
under the laws of a foreign country.33 The court based its reasoning
both on the cases leading up to Gecas'4 and on the possible erosion
of domestic law enforcement. 35 The court concluded that "the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not a personal 'right'
25 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1410. Among the documents made available were pay stubs
and duty rosters. The material made available through these files has resulted in more cases
being filed (twenty) or investigated (348) by the OSI than at any other time in its history.
David Friedman, The Nazis Among Us, (pt. 2), NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at B4.
26 Gecas 1, 830 F.Supp. at 1410.
27 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
28 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1551.
2 Id. at 1552.
30 Id.
s1 Gecas , 830 F. Supp. at 1406.
32 Id. at 1407 (citing Zicarelli v. NewJersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472,
478 (1972)).
S3 Id. at 1423.
3 Id. at 1414-21. The court concluded that generally the background cases did not
sanction extension of the privilege to protection from foreign prosecution. Id. For a
discussion of the background cases used by the district court to support its conclusion, see
infra Part III.
35 Id. at 1422. The court was concerned that if a witness were allowed to invoke the
privilege for fear of foreign prosecution, "the enforcement of our domestic laws would,
necessarily, become dependent on matters of foreign law." Id.
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conferred upon persons within the protection of the American law ....
Instead, it is intended to regulate the actions of the government of the
United States and its component states . "..."36
C. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's findings,
focusing first on whether the court was correct in its determination
that Gecas faced a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
The court then reviewed de novo the district court's determination that
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination did not protect
witnesses from testifying to information that might later subject them
to foreign prosecution. 8 In light of its de novo review, the Court of
Appeals held that the district court had correctly determined that
Gecas faced a real and substantial fear of prosecution.3 9 However, it
reversed the district court's finding as to the Fifth Amendment and
held instead that "[t]he Constitution's protection of the individual, as
embodied in the Fifth Amendment, prevents requiring him to provide
evidence which may allow a foreign government to prosecute him."
4 °
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitution-
al issue of the application of the Fifth Amendment to those fearing
foreign prosecution, it has, in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of
Investigation,4 developed a two-part test in dealing with the ques-
tion.42 Using that test in Gecas, the Eleventh Circuit first examined
the basic precepts of the Fifth Amendment privilege.43 Next, the
court questioned whether Gecas could demonstrate that the testimony
sought to be compelled would incriminate him under foreign law.44
In order to decide that question, the court looked to the laws of the
three countries that Gecas claimed might prosecute him: Israel,
36 Id. at 1421 (citing United States v. Tucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
37 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1556.
38 Id. at 1562.
39 Id. For a discussion of the court's analysis of Gecas' real and substantial fear see infra
notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
40 Id. at 1567.
41 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
42 Id. at 481. The witness must satisfy two components before reaching the Fifth
Amendment question: (1) whether the compelled testimony would tend to incriminate the
witness under a foreign law; and (2) whether there is a real and substantial danger of that
testimony resulting in such incrimination. Id. Only after the witness has met these tests may
the court address the constitutional question. Id.
43 Gecas 50 F.3d at 1552-53. The court referred to a number of Supreme Court cases
that had extended the privilege. These included the extension of the privilege to "any
compelled testimony which may lead to discovery of any evidence later used ... in a criminal
prosecution," id. at 1552 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)), and its
extension to resident aliens. Id. at 1553 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
(1953)).
44 Id. at 1553 (citing Zicarelli v. NewJersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472,
478-80 (1972)). For a discussion of Zicaretli, see infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
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Lithuania and Germany.45 The court determined that his testimony,
if it implicated him in the deaths of Lithuanian Jews during the war,
would "inevitably tend to incriminate him under the laws of Lithuania
and Israel."4 6
Next, the court reviewed the district court's analysis of whether
Gecas faced a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. In so
doing, the court identified several factors to be examined in deciding
whether the fear was real and substantial.47 The first factor the court
contemplated was the likelihood of disclosure of compelled testimony
to a country with an interest in prosecuting Gecas.48 In its analysis of
this question, the court looked at the purpose and policies of the OSI.
In particular, the court considered OSI's agreements with both Israel
and Lithuania to share incriminating evidence that it gathered on
suspected Nazi collaborators.49 In addition, the court dismissed the
OSI's argument that a sealing order would protect Gecas' testimony
from disclosure and, thus, distinguished several cases in which it had
previously held that a sealing order was sufficient protection from
disclosure.5" The second factor the court examined was whether any
of the potential charges would entitle the prosecuting country to have
Gecas extradited.5' After concluding that Gecas' deportation could
be considered de facto extradition, the court held that "there is a
substantial likelihood that, if deported, then Gecas will be sent forcibly
to a country with the ability and desire to prosecute him."52 Finally,
the court addressed the question of whether Israel and Lithuania have
prosecuted or are prosecuting persons accused of collaborating with
the Nazis.55 The court decided, in light of Israel's prior prosecution
of suspected Nazis and Lithuania's "potential and apparent inclination
to do so,"54 that Gecas' fear was real and substantial.55
Only after concluding that Gecas' fear was real and substantial did
the court address the application of the Fifth Amendment to those
who fear foreign prosecution. In its de novo review, the court found
45 Id. at 1554.
46 Id. at 1556. The court found that Germany's potential to prosecute Gecas was
"superfluous" in light of the inevitable incrimination under Israeli and Lithuanian law. Id.
47 Id. at 1557 (citing In re Application of the President's Comm'n on Organized Crime
(Scaduto), 763 F.2d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 1985)).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1558.
50 Id. at 1559. For a discussion of the sealing order, see infra notes 157-68 and
accompanying text.
51 Id. at 1560. For a discussion of extradition and deportation, see infra note 169-76
and accompanying text.
52 Id. at 1561.
53 Id.
54 1& at 1562. The court noted that it was not required to assess the "exact probability
of prosecution, but only whether Gecas potentially could be prosecuted." Id. at 1561 (citing
United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original)).
55 Id. at 1562.
[VOL. 21
1996] THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN PROSECUTION 473
that the Fifth Amendment privilege supports the two goals of
"constraining the government from overzealous prosecution of
individuals and securing individual liberties."56 It concluded that the
two policies were not mutually exclusive and that both could be served
when the privilege was invoked properly.5 7 In its analysis, the court
also discussed and rejected the reasoning of the Tenth and Fourth
Circuits in their decisions to limit the privilege to those fearing
domestic prosecution. 8 Instead, after examining all of the issues, the
court found that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was the embodiment of the Constitution's protection of the
individual, and as such should be extended to those with a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution. 9
III. Background Law
A. The Privilege Generally
The history behind the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination goes beyond the borders of the United States and
beyond the confines of the Constitution. 6 The privilege is broad in
its reach, applying not only to answers that could incriminate on their
own, but also to answers that "would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence." 6' In addition, the privilege extends to non-resident aliens
as well as citizens62 and to any proceeding where an answer could
incriminate a witness in a future criminal proceeding.5 However,
despite its breadth, the privilege also has limitations. It may only be
invoked if there is a "substantial and real" danger of incrimination,'
and it cannot be invoked when the testimony sought could not be used
56 Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964)).
57 Id. at 1563.
58 See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 807 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to those fearing foreign prosecution); In re Parker,
411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub. nom. Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96
(1970) (noting that the Fifth Amendment privilege only protects those fearing prosecution
in domestic cases).
59 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1567.
60 There is some authority that the privilege dates back to ancient Talmudic law;,
however, there is also authority that the idea behind the privilege actually originated in
medieval England. Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (relying on N.
Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and its Equivalent inJewish Law, 17 DECALOGUE 1, 12 (1967)). But
see LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 70
(1968) (arguing that there is no proof that Talmudic references had any influence on the
development of the privilege).
61 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1415 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951)).
62 Id. (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)).
63 Id. (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)).
64 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
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as a basis for criminal prosecution."5 Finally, the privilege is limited
by immunity statutes which "seek a rational accommodation between
the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of
government to compel citizens to testify."66 Despite the fact that the
extensions and limitations of the privilege have continued to evolve,
the question of whether the privilege applies to those in fear of foreign
prosecution has never been answered satisfactorily.6 7
B. The First Step: The Privilege in Early English and American Law
In 1749, the English Court of Exchequer held that the privilege
against self-incrimination protected witnesses from being compelled to
give testimony that could be used to convict them in other jurisdic-
tions.' This was followed by several other British cases that reiterated
the English rule that the privilege against self-incrimination extended
to those who feared foreign prosecution. 9 American courts, both
before and after the Constitution was enacted in 1789, continued to
rely on the English rule.70 However, before the Fifth Amendment was
incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 many of the cases came to contradictory conclusions
65 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1415 (citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,597-600 (1896)).
66 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446. The Court states, "The existence of these statutes reflects
the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the
only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime." Id
67 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1414. The court states that "[t]he case law bearing on
whether the Fifth Amendment protects against fear of foreign prosecution provides no clear
guidance." Id.
68 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (quoting
East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep 1010 (1749)).
69 See, e.g., Murphy, 378 U.S. at 58-61 (discussing Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep.
157 (1750) (holding that no one is bound to answer questions that might subject them to
punishment in another court); United States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. 79, (1867) (representing
the settled English rule regarding self-incrimination that a witness is not compelled to answer
any question which has a tendency to expose him to a breach of law)). But see United States
v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the present English rule does
not recognize such protection and that the Murphy court's reasoning has been attacked).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828) (holding
that the "rule" was that persons are not bound to make admissions that would expose them
to penalties); see also Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906) (allowing a witness to refuse to
answer because he would be exposed to penalties under state law). But see Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906) (finding that the English rule applied only to courts in the same
jurisdiction or under the same sovereignty).
71 Beginning in the early 1960s, the Supreme Court began holding that different parts
of the first eight amendments were applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generaly Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double
jeopardy); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (self-incrimination). Prior to 1964, the Fifth Amendment was not held applicable
to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Only after the Fifth Amendment was
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment did the cases begin to examine the
application of the right against self-incrimination to those fearing truly "foreign" prosecution.
See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57 (noting that the Court's extension of the Fifth Amendment to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment necessitated a reconsideration of whether the
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in interpreting the scope of the privilege as it applied to the states. 72
In 1964, when the Supreme Court ruled in Malloy v. Hogan73 that the
Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the debate over the privilege began in earnest.74
C. The Next Step: The Privilege After the Application of the Fifth
Amendment to the States Through the Fourteenth Amendment
Immediately after deciding Malloy, the Court applied the Fifth
Amendment to the states in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor.75 In Murphy, the Court examined the English and American
precedent and the policies behind the privilege.76 After finding that
the "correct" English rule was that witnesses were protected against
"disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country,"77
Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, concluded that "there is no
continuing legal vitality to, or historical justification for, the rule that
one jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness to
give testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in
another jurisdiction."78 In conjunction with its holding, the Court
decided that compelling testimony when immunity had been offered
was a viable option, as long as the immunity prevented the use of the
compelled testimony and its "fruits."7 9
privilege extended protection to a witness in one jurisdiction from being compelled to testify
in another jurisdiction).
72 See genera~ly Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958) (holding that the right of states
to require full disclosure in exchange for immunity, as a means of investigating and
discovering corruption and misconduct which violate state law, cannot be denied on the
ground that it may expose the witness to federal prosecution); United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931) (stating that the Constitution does not relieve a witness before a federal
tribunal of the duty of testifying because he might thereby incriminate himself under the laws
of a state).
73 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
74 See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
75 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, petitioners were subpoenaed to testify about a work
stoppage at a New Jersey pier. Id. at 53. After refusing to testify on the grounds that the
answers might tend to incriminate them, the petitioners were granted immunity from
prosecution under New York and New Jersey state law. Id. at 53-54. However, because the
immunity did not protect them from federal prosecution, they still refused to testify. Id. at
54. Civil and criminal contempt of court charges were brought against them and the civil
contempt charges were subsequently upheld by the district court on the ground that a state
may constitutionally compel witnesses to give testimony despite its potential to incriminate
them under federal law. Id.
76 Id. at 55-63.
77 Id. at 72 (quoting United States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (1867)).
78 Id. at 77.
79 Id. at 79. Eight years later in Kastigar v. United States the Court clarified that a
government can compel testimony despite the privilege so long as it grants immunity against
governmental use of the testimony or any evidence derived therefrom. 406 U.S. 441, 453,
457-61 (1972). The Court explicitly held that use and derivative use, or "use-fruit," immunity
was co-extensive with the privilege and that transactional immunity, which would prohibit
prosecution for any offense to which compelled testimony related, was not required. Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 453. For further discussion of Kastigar, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying
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Five years later, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
decided In re Parker."° The Tenth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether a grant of immunity from both federal and state prosecu-
tion" was enough to override the witness's Fifth Amendment privilege
when the prosecution she feared was from a foreign government.
s2
The court held that the grant of immunity protected the witness from
foreign prosecution, but even if it had not, "[t]he [F]ifth
[A]mendment was intended to protect against self-incrimination for
crimes committed against the United States and the several states but
need not and should not be interpreted as applying to acts made
criminal by the laws of a foreign nation."" The court reasoned that
Justice Goldberg's references and apparent approval of the English
rule in Murphy were simply "by way of argumentative analogy to this
nation's state-federal relationship and carrie[d] no further persua-
sion."8
4
In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to the one
in Parker. In Kastigar v. United States, 5 the Court was faced with the
question of whether testimony could be compelled by granting
immunity from the use of the testimony or evidence derived therefrom
in subsequent criminal proceedings.86  The Court noted, "the
existence of these [immunity] statutes reflects the importance of
testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such character that
the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicat-
ed in the crime."87  Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the
Court, identified the constitutional inquiry as whether the immunity
text.
80 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub. nom. Parker v. United States, 397
U.S. 96 (1970). Parker involved a witness who refused to testify in front of a grand jury about
her alleged involvement in the destruction of a number of public service towers in the
Denver area. Although granted immunity, the witness continued to refuse to testify on the
grounds that her answers would tend to incriminate her in a Canadian crime and that
immunity would not protect her from extradition for that crime. Id. at 1068.
81 Id. at 1069. The court referred to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which
reads in pertinent part: "[A]ny person to whom disclosure is made ... shall not disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules .... "
FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(e)(2). The court held that application of Rule 6(e) was sufficient to
ensure that the information disclosed by the witness would be unavailable to the foreign
government in either extradition hearings or in a criminal proceeding within that country.
Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070.
82 Parker, 411 F.2d at 1069.
83 Id. at 1070.
84 Id. But seeMoses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857,878 n.30 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting that
there is nothing in Murphy that suggests it was intended to be limited only to the state-federal
context). For a discussion of Moses, see infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
85 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The specific issue posed in Kastigar was whether testimony can
be compelled from a witness who has asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege by granting
"use and derivative use" immunity, or whether "transactional" immunity is necessary to
compel testimony. Id. at 443; see also supra note 79.
86 Id. at 442.
87 Id. at 446.
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granted was coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment
privilege.88 Using the reasoning developed in Murphy, that immunity
from use and derivative use "leaves the witness and the Federal
Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a grant of immunity,"89 the
Court concluded that "immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege. "90
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,9 decided
on the same day as Kastigar, the Supreme Court again faced questions
concerning the conditions under which testimony can be compelled
from an unwilling witness invoking the Fifth Amendment.9 2 First, the
Court reiterated its holding in Kastigar that "immunity from use and
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege, and is
therefore sufficient to compel testimony."9 3  Next, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a grant of immunity can supplant the
Fifth Amendment privilege when the individual asserting it fears only
foreign prosecution. 4 The Court established that the privilege
protects against "real dangers, not remote and speculative possibili-
ties,"" and as such the witness must show that he has a "real and
substantial" fear of foreign prosecution before the constitutional
question can be reached. 6 After concluding that the witness did not
face a real and substantial danger,9 7 the Court declined to address the
constitutional question.
9 8
After its two 1972 decisions, the Supreme Court relegated the issue
of the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
88 Id. at 449.
89 Id. at 458-59 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 79 (1964)).
90 Id. at 458. Justices Marshall and Douglas filed separate dissenting opinions, but both
essentially argued that use and derivative use immunity are not coextensive with the privilege.
Id. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote, "a greater margin of protection
is required in order to provide a reliable guarantee that the witness is in exactly the same
position as if he had not testified. That margin can be provided only by immunity from
prosecution for the offenses to which the testimony relates, i.e., transactional immunity." Id.
at 468-69 (Marshal, J., dissenting).
91 406 U.S. 472 (1972). In Zicareli, the witness was subpoenaed to appear before the
NewJersey State Commission of Investigation concerning his involvement in organized crime,
racketeering, and political corruption in New Jersey. Id. at 474. He refused to answer
questions, despite a grant of immunity, alleging, inter alia, that his answers would tend to
incriminate him under foreign law. d. at 478.
92 Id. at 473.
93 Id. at 475.
94 Id. at 478.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 480. Although the appellant refused to answer 100 questions, he cited only one
specific question as posing a substantial danger of foreign incrimination. Id. at 479-80. The
Court found that the witness could have truthfully answered that one question without
disclosing any information which would actually incriminate him. Id. at 480.
98 Id.
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tion as it applied to those fearing foreign prosecution to the lower
courts. The first court to address the issue after Kastigar and Zicarelli
was the District Court for the District of Connecticut in In re
Cardassi.99 In Cardassi, a grand jury witness who had been granted
immunity refused to answer questions on the basis that the immunity
would not protect her from the foreign prosecution she feared."°
After a preliminary determination that the witness had a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution, the court then addressed the
constitutional question that had been left open by Zicarelli."
In its decision, the court declined to follow the Tenth Circuit's
holding in In re Parker and held instead that Murphy"0 2 "provides
sufficient guidance for a determination that the privilege can be
invoked in these circumstances." °3 The Cardassi court then ad-
dressed two arguments raised by the government. First, the court
dismissed the government's claims that the Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens against the actions of foreign governments. 0 4  It
noted that the cases relied on by the government were extradition
cases and, as such, they were concerned with possible Fifth Amend-
ment violations committed by a foreign government.105  In contrast,
it held that the Fifth Amendment could not be ignored when it is
invoked in an American court and only its proper scope need be
decided.0 6  Relying on Murphy, the court held that the scope
included use of the privilege against compelled testimony that could
be used in a foreign jurisdiction.'0 7 The second argument raised by
the government concerned hampered law enforcement efforts.' By
allowing the privilege when a witness who was immunized against
domestic use of the compelled testimony had only a fear of foreign
prosecution, the government argued, law enforcement efforts were
99 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
100 Id. at 1082. Cardassi feared prosecution in Mexico on the basis that the questions
that she was to be asked concerned her involvement in marijuana smuggling from Mexico.
Id. at 1080.
101 406 U.S. at 481. "Should the Commission inquire into matters that might incriminate
him under foreign law and pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution, and should such
inquiry be sustained over a relevancy objection, then a constitutional question will be squarely
presented." Id. (citation omitted).
102 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
103 Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1084. The court noted that although Murphy examined a
number of holdings that were concerned with claims dealing with the extension from federal
to state proceedings and vice versa, the Court's acceptance of the English rule in United States
v. McRae "clearly makes the privilege a protection against foreign prosecution." Id. at 1085
(citing United States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. 79 (1867)).
104 Id. at 1085.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1085-86.
107 Id. at 1086.
108 Id. The government was especially concerned with law enforcement efforts directed
at narcotics laws. Id.
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frustrated. 9 The court held that "a constitutional privilege does not
disappear, nor even lose its normal vitality, simply because its use may
hinder law enforcement activities. That is a consequence of nearly all
the protections of the Bill of Rights, and a consequence that was...
deemed justified by the need to protect individual rights.""'
In United States v. Fanagan,"' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit did not reach the constitutional question of the scope
of the Fifth Amendment because it found the witness did not have a
real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.12 However, for the
first time, the court suggested several inquiries to determine whether
there was a substantial and real fear of foreign prosecution." 3 In
addition, the court addressed the question of whether Rule 6(e)" 4
provides sufficient protection of grand jury testimony which might tend
to incriminate a witness in a foreign prosecution." 5 Finding that
"experience shows grand jury proceedings are not leakproof,"" 6 the
court held that absent a law that would shield an immunized witness
from extradition, it would determine by looking at the factors "in each
case whether the risk is sufficiently substantial tojustify a real fear that
the evidence might incriminate the witness in a foreign prosecu-
tion."117
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit decided two cases in which it held that
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not protect
against foreign prosecution. The first, United States v. (Under Seal)
(Araneta),"8 involved former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos'
109 Id.
110 Id.
"'l 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). Flanagan was subpoenaed to appear before a federal
grand jury in New York regarding his involvement in a conspiracy to smuggle guns and
ammunition from the United States to Ireland and Great Britain to be used by the Irish
Republican Army. Id. at 118. He refused to testify, despite a grant of immunity, on the
grounds that the immunity would not protect him from prosecution by the British and Irish
governments. Id. at 119.
112 Id. at 124. The court cited a number of reasons why it felt Flanagan did not have a
real or reasonable fear of foreign prosecution. Among those were: (1) the absence of any
present or prospective foreign prosecution of him; (2) the limit of the grand jury's
questioning to activities within the United States; (3) the non-extraditability of Flanagan for
the crimes suggested; and (4) the government's assurance that it would not reveal his
testimony and would, in fact, oppose any effort to extradite him. Id.
113 Id. at 121. Among the suggested questions were: "whether there is an existing or
potential foreign prosecution of him; what foreign charges could be filed against him;
whether prosecution of them would be initiated or furthered by his testimony; whether any
such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have him extradited from the United
States; and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony given here would be disclosed to
the foreign government." Id.
114 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
115 Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 122-23.
116 Id. at 123.
117 Id. at 124.
118 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986), cer denied sub. nom. Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S.
1301 (1986).
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daughter and son-in-law, who were served with grand jury subpoenas
in the United States but refused to answer questions on the grounds
that the answers would tend to incriminate them under the laws of the
Philippines."' The Fourth Circuit determined, using the factors
assembled by the lanagan121 court, that the couple had a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution. 2 1 The court then concluded
that Rule 6(e) could not reduce the risk of self-incrimination "ade-
quately to obviate the necessity of... determining the reach of the
Fifth Amendment."'22 In its analysis of the Fifth Amendment ques-
tion, the court looked to Murphy2 and, like the Tenth Circuit in In
re Parker,'24 determined that the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy
was simply a logical consequence of its holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege was fully applicable to the states. 25 The court went
on to hold that "the Fifth Amendment privilege applies only where the
sovereign compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the
testimony are both restrained by the Fifth Amendment from compel-
ling self-incrimination. "126
Similarly, in the second case, United States v. (Under Seal),'27 the
Fourth Circuit upheld its prior decision that the Fifth Amendment
privilege did not apply to those fearing foreign prosecution. It noted
in the opinion that, as mentioned in the previous case, there "may be
an exception to the rule announced therein where it could be shown
that the United States has ... participat[ed] in a foreign prosecu-
tion."126
Before 1995, several other circuit courts 29 approached the issue
119 Id. at 923. The Aranetas were denied immunization by the district court, but were
granted domestic use and derivative use immunity by the Fourth Circuit. They then argued
that although they were sufficiently immunized against domestic prosecution, their fear of
foreign prosecution kept their right to invoke the Fifth Amendment alive. Id. at 922-23.
120 692 F.2d at 121.
121 (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 923-24.
122 Id. at 925.
123 378 U.S. 52 (1964). For a discussion of Murphy, see supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text.
124 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of Parker, see supra notes 80-84 and
accompanying text.
125 (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 927 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). The court
also noted that the present English rule, enacted by the British Parliament in the Civil
Evidence Act of 1968, does not recognize protection against self-incrimination under foreign
laws. Id.
126 Id. at 926.
127 807 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1986). This case concerned an alien who refused to testify
before a grand jury on the basis that his answers, despite domestic immunity, would tend to
incriminate him under the law of a foreign country. Id. at 375.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Envtl. Tectonics v. Kirkpatrick, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding no
substantial danger of foreign prosecution); United States v. Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1983) (declining to address the constitutional issue because the witness did not show a real
and substantial fear); In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982
(1982) (finding no real and substantial fear); United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.
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of whether the Fifth Amendment protects against foreign prosecution;
however, only the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Joudis130 com-
mented on the constitutional question. Although the court in Joudis
did not reach the constitutional question because it determined that
the witness was sufficiently protected by a grant of domestic immunity
and a sealing order and had thus failed to establish a real and
substantial fear, it did briefly address the constitutional issue.''
While recognizing that the right asserted by the witness was "question-
able," the court noted that Chief Justice Burger, in staying an order of
contempt pending review of (Araneta), concluded that "there is a fair
prospect that a majority of this court will decide the issue in favor of
the applicants [the Aranetas]."132
Finally, in Moses v. Allard,3 ' the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan. discussed once again the policies and history
behind the privilege. The court concluded that "[t]he language,
history, and policies of the Fifth Amendment privilege support its
application to situations in which testimony compelled domestically
may be used in a foreign criminal prosecution."'34 In resisting the
Fourth Circuit's analysis, the Moses court contended that the focus of
the privilege should not be "the jurisdiction in which the compelled
testimony is to be used, but rather ... which governmental entity,
under which law, would effect the compulsion."
3 5
The case law leading up to Gecas has left lower courts wallowing
in its deeply confusing and treacherous wake. Of the ten circuit courts
to decide cases involving a witness who invoked the privilege when they
feared foreign prosecution,3 6 only two courts, the Tenth Circuit in
1977) (refusing to address the constitutional question because the witness' danger was too
remote and speculative to qualify).
130 800 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1986). In Joudis, a witness called to testify against an alleged
Nazi war criminal asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the
basis that his testimony would subject him to prosecution by the Soviet Union if, as he feared,
he were deported by the OSI. Id. at 160.
'1 Id. at 160-61.
132 Id. at 161. Although the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari, this
statement is significant for the fact that it is the only pronouncement from a Supreme Court
Justice on this issue in the last twenty-three years. Id.
139 779 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1991). The defendant in Moses was the owner of a
number of domestic and foreign companies. Id. at 859. Four of her creditors, after filing
an involuntary bankruptcy petition against her, attempted to question her about her holdings;
however, she refused to answer their questions on the basis that her answers would tend to
incriminate her in a pending criminal proceeding in Switzerland. Id. at 859-61.
'34 Id. at 882.
'5 Id. at 881.
136 E.g., Envtl. Tectonics v. Kirkpatrick, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Sealed Case,
825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Application of the President's Comm'n (Scaduto), 763
F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985); In re GrandJury Proceedings (Chevrier), 748 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.
1984); In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Nigro), 705
F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1982); In re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1975); In reTierney, 465 F.2d
806 (5th Cir. 1972).
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In re Parker"3 7 and the Fourth Circuit in (Araneta),3 8 actually
reached the constitutional question. Although both courts held that
the Fifth Amendment does not apply to those fearing foreign
prosecution, neither established a consistent rule and both based their
holdings on different reasoning."3 9 Additionally, a number of district
courts have held that the Fifth Amendment privilege does apply in
similar cases. 4° Essentially two opposing lines of reasoning have
developed. In deciding Gecas, the Eleventh Circuit took on the task of
finding a middle ground for other courts to navigate between the two
paths.
IV. Significance of the Case
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of Investigation,4' Justice
Goldberg wrote that the privilege against self-incrimination reflects
"our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt .... "142 In fact,
what the privilege has done, at least to the courts attempting to
interpret its scope, is subject them to a cruel dilemma of either
protecting individual rights143 or protecting the goals of government
in domestic law enforcement. 44  In Gecas, the Eleventh Circuit
attempted to resolve this dilemma by fashioning prior decisions and
the policies behind the privilege into a balancing test of the two goals.
In essence, the Eleventh Circuit in Gecas tried to find a middle
ground between the two lines of reasoning that have developed since
Murphy, and the Eleventh Circuit in Gecas tried to find a middle
ground between them. The first line of reasoning, which the district
court followed, uses the argument that the Supreme Court in Murphy
137 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub. nom. Parker v. United States, 397
U.S. 96 (1970).
138 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
139 See, e.g., (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 927-28; Parker 411 F.2d at 1070. Both courts held that
Justice Goldberg's apparent approval of the English rule in Murphy was by way of analogy to
the state-federal relationship. (Araneta), 794 F.2d at 927; Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070. However,
the court in Parker restricted the privilege based on the idea that it applied only to crimes
committed against the United States and the several states, Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070, while the
court in (Araneta) based its restriction of the privilege on whether the sovereign using the
testimony and the sovereign compelling the testimony were both restrained by the
Constitution. 794 F.2d at 926.
14 See, e.g., In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972); Moses v. Allard, 779 F.
Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
14 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
142 Id. at 55.
143 See, e.g., Moses, 779 F. Supp. at 882-83 (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege
is an individual right); In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972) (noting that
the hindrance of domestic law enforcement is justified to protect individual rights).
144 See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
application of the privilege in an effort to protect domestic law enforcement); In re Parker,
411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969) (reasoning that domestic law enforcement would be
hindered by extension of the privilege to those fearing foreign prosecution).
[VOL. 21
1996] THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN PROSECUTION 483
was only analogizing to the English rule and that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was never intended or sanctioned
as a protection for those who fear foreign prosecution. 145 Courts that
have followed the second line of reasoning read Murphy, on its face, as
approving the English rule that the privilege extends to those fearing
foreign prosecution.'4 6 The Eleventh Circuit ignored both lines of
reasoning, and, rather than focusing on the English rule and its proper
or improper interpretation in Murphy, the court instead focused on the
policies behind the privilege and then examined the background law
in light of those policies. 47
The court's decision to avoid the background law was prudent in
light of the uncertainty over what the various cases have meant to the
application of the privilege to those fearing foreign prosecution. 4 s
In addition, the reliance on Murphy by followers of both lines of
reasoning seems flawed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Zicarelli.'49  In explicitly avoiding the constitutional question in
Zicarelli the court indicated that Murphy, whether interpreted on its
face or by analogy, did not decide the issue."' Therefore, by taking
the decisions from a multitude of confusing and contradictory cases
and using the policies of the Fifth Amendment to fashion them into
a clarified rule, the Eleventh Circuit found a useful application of the
background law to the constitutional question.
However, before it could reach the constitutional question and the
policies behind the privilege, the court noted that the Supreme Court
had established that a witness first must demonstrate, "(1) that the
testimony would tend to incriminate him under foreign law and (2)
that he has a 'real and substantial' fear of foreign prosecution.
After the court examined the questions posed to Gecas by the OSI and
the laws of Israel, Lithuania and Germany, it determined that the first
hurdle to reaching the constitutional question had been met and that
Gecas' answers would tend to incriminate him under foreign law.
51
The court then turned to an examination of three factors, similar to
those first outlined in Flanagan,15 to decide whether a real and
145 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. 1403, 1421 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
146 In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (D. Conn. 1972) (stating that the Murphy
court's acceptance of the English rule clearly makes the privilege a protection against foreign
prosecution).
147 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1562-65.
148 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp at 1414 (noting that the case law dealing with the Fifth
Amendment's application to those fearing foreign prosecution "provides no clear guidance").
149 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
150 Id. at 478.
151 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553 (citing Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 478-80 (1972)).
152 Id. at 1556.
153 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1962). Although the Gecas court relies generally on its
own holding in In re Application of President's Comm'n on Crime, the factors are tellingly
similar to the elements originally proposed in Flanagan. Id.; see supra notes 112-13 and
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substantial fear of foreign prosecution existed.'54
First, the court reviewed the likelihood that Gecas' testimony
would be disclosed to a foreign government. The court scrutinized
OSI's purpose and function and noted that "OSI's sole and exclusive
jurisdiction is the collection of information and the institution of legal
proceedings against suspected Nazi war criminals."' 55 The court then
determined that in light of that purpose and OSI's liaisons with the
foreign countries capable of prosecuting Gecas, there was a high risk
of disclosure.'56
In addition, the court dismissed OSI's contention that a sealing
order would sufficiently supplant any privilege that might exist. 57
The Supreme Court has held that in order to supplant the Fifth
Amendment privilege, any protection offered must be coextensive with
the privilege.'58 In domestic prosecutions, use and derivative use
immunity has been held to be coextensive'5 9 and consequently courts
have been able to compel testimony with a grant of immunity when the
witness fears only domestic prosecution."6 However, where a witness
fears foreign prosecution, new issues are raised because the United
States government has no power to grant immunity from the use of
testimony by a foreign government. 6' In view of this limitation,
courts have attempted to fashion other protections in order to compel
testimony. The most common has been the use of Rule 6(e) of the
accompanying text.
1 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1556-57.
155 Id. at 1558.
156 Id. at 1559-60.
157 Id. at 1559.
158 See Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1413 (noting that where a real danger of incrimination
exists, the government may not compel testimony when a witness has claimed the privilege
unless "it supplants the privilege with protection of equivalent extent and scope" as the
privilege) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973)).
159 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The United States immunity statute
states:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to - (1)
a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress .... and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). For a further discussion of Kastigar see supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
16o Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462. For a further discussion of the use of immunity to supplant
the privilege where the witness fears foreign prosecution, see Debra Ciardiello, Note, Seeking
Refuge in the Fifth Amendment: The Applicability of the Privilege Against Seif-Incimination to
Individuals Who Risk Incrimination Outside the United States, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 722 (1992).
161 United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d. 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 62 which provides secrecy for
testimony in cases where the witness invokes the privilege before a
grand jury.'6 3 In non-grand jury cases, courts have attempted to treat
a sealing order as a functional equivalent."
In Gecas the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the district court's
holding that a sealing order would be ineffective to prevent Gecas'
testimony from being used against him in a foreign court." In its
discussion, the circuit court essentially makes the effectiveness of the
sealing order one factor to be considered when looking at "the
surrounding circumstances and context to determine whether the
asserted fear is real or imaginary."'6 6 The court distinguished several
previous cases on their facts and held that the circumstances in Gecas,
in particular the OSI's obligation to disclose any evidence it obtained
to Lithuania, 16 7 indicated that a sealing order would not be effec-
tive."' This case-by-case approach would create substantially more
fairness than declaring, without observation of surrounding circum-
stances, that Rule 6(e), or a sealing order, are effective protections
against a fear of foreign prosecution. Although there may be cases
where these protections are enough to prevent a witness' fear from
becoming real and substantial, it is infinitely more fair to assess that
question on a case by case basis, as the Gecas court implies, than to
pronounce a sweeping across-the-board policy.
Next, the court questioned whether Gecas' testimony would entitle
a foreign jurisdiction to extradite him.169 In its analysis, the court
likened the OSI's use of deportation in this case to de facto extradi-
tion. 7' The appellate court recognized that despite the right
afforded to Gecas by deportation, namely that he could designate one
country to which he would like to be sent, it was unlikely that he would
be sent anywhere except a country that would have the ability and the
desire to prosecute him.'1' It also noted that, if compelled, Gecas'
testimony might well be used by a foreign country to extradite
him. Because the court's discussion of this subject was not
162 FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(2).
163 Se, e.g., In reBaird, 668 F.2d 432, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1982); In reTierney, 465 F.2d. 806,
811 (5th Cir. 1972).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1986).
165 Gecas, 50 F.3d. at 1559.
166 United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1982).
167 Gecas, 50 F.3d. at 1559.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1560.
170 Id. For an in depth discussion of deportation as defacto extradition, see Michael J.
Bowe, Note, Deportation as De Facto Extradition: The Matter of Joseph Doherty, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 263 (1990) (distinguishing between deportation as a protection of internal
welfare and extradition as the mechanism for returning criminals to foreign countries).
'7' Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1560-61.
172 Id.
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elaborate, it left several questions unanswered; especially when viewed
in conjunction with the district court's consideration of this issue.'73
For instance, why is OSI using deportation to remove Gecas, when
extradition is generally considered to be "the mechanism designated
by Congress to return criminals to foreign countries?"'74 Or, alterna-
tively, what are an individual's rights in an extradition proceeding as
opposed to a deportation hearing, and in particular, what rights are
being supplanted by using deportation as de facto extradition as the
court suggested is the case with Gecas? 75 The court's treatment of
this subject is limited, but it accomplishes two things: (1) it contributes
to the court's analysis of Gecas' real and substantial fear; and (2) it
leaves the door open for other courts or other branches of government
to investigate this use of deportation. 176
Finally, the court examined whether the countries of concern to
Gecas have, or are currently, prosecuting suspected Nazis. 177  The
court returned to its previous discussion of the laws of Israel and
Lithuania and concluded that Israel has prosecuted alleged Nazi
collaborators in the past and that Lithuania has "the potential and
apparent inclination to do so."1 78  The court stated that it is not
necessary to calculate the exact probability of prosecution, but only
whether there is a potential for Gecas to be prosecuted.7 9  After a
combined assessment of all the Flanagan factors and the role of the
sealing order and extradition in the case, the court then concluded
that Gecas did have a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecu-
tion. 80
In its discussion of the application of the Fifth Amendment, the
court focused on the policies and goals behind the right against self-
incrimination. The court identified the two main goals of the privilege
as, "constraining the government from overzealous prosecution of
individuals and securing individual liberties."'' The court rejected
the district court's contention that the privilege only protected an
173 Gecas 1 830 F. Supp. at 1410-11; see also Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 867-69
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (discussing extradition as it relates to a witness wishing to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
174 Bowe, supra note 170, at 269.
175 Bowe, supra note 170, at 269; see also Gecas , 830 F. Supp at 1410-11 (discussing the
deportation case of Ivan Demjanjuk). The district court notes in Gecas that the OSI actively
encouraged the extradition of Demjanjuk by Israel. In fact, although the OSI had
determined that Demjanjuk was "Ivan the Terrible," a notorious guard at the Nazi death
camp Treblinka, the Supreme Court of Israel overturned his death sentence after new
evidence, apparently withheld by the OSI, came to light. Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1410.
176 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1410 (noting that the Justice Department's Office of
Professional Responsibility is conducting an investigation into the Demjanjuk case).
177 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1561-62.
178 Id. at 1561.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1562.
181 Id.
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individual from government overreaching in the enforcement of
domestic law.'" 2 Instead, the court held:
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is an individual
right; it is a matter of individual dignity .... Just as the privilege is extended
to prevent overzealous prosecution and to constrain the government, the
privilege creates in the individual the freedom to remain silent where the
testimony may be adverse to his penal interests."
By concentrating so much of its preliminary discussion on whether
Gecas had a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution,'8 4 the
court was then able to use this to balance the opposing policy
arguments presented both by other circuit courts in In re Parkeys s
and United States v. (Under Seal)"6 and by the district court in its Gecas
opinion. 87 The appellate court in Gecas argued that if witnesses can
satisfactorily prove that they have a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution, then the privilege's policy of protecting individual rights
outweighs the rights of the government to compel testimony."8 The
court stated:
[W]e are convinced that requiring the witness to demonstrate a real and
substantial fear of foreign prosecution eliminates the apprehension that
a person could manufacture a potential for foreign prosecution or raise
this specter solely to frustrate domestic law enforcement.. . . [I]f the fear
is both real and substantial, then protecting the individual, one of the
primary goals of the privilege, supersedes the goals of domestic law
enforcement... . We believe that such a balance both reasonably serves
the purposes of the privilege and preserves the goals of domestic law
enforcement. 188
This argument was directly contrary to the lower court's opinion, which
stated that if the privilege was extended to protect against foreign
prosecution it "would seriously erode domestic law enforcement."' 9 '
The appellate court also noted that the argument for the protection
of domestic law enforcement lost some of its value in Gecas since the
OSI was investigating Gecas independent of any cooperation or
testimony by him.'9 ' The court missed the opportunity on this point
to note that this scenario could theoretically be applied in most cases
where the scope of the Fifth Amendment is at issue, since, despite its
182 Id. at 1564.
183 Id. at 1564-65.
184 Id. at 1553-62.
185 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
186 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
187 830 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Fla. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 1549 (11 th Cir.
1995).
188 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1562-65.
189 Id. at 1564-65.
190 Gecas , 830 F. Supp. at 1422.
191 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1564.
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potential value, 192 rarely is a witness' testimony the only information
available.
At this point, the court had taken several steps toward clarifying
the balance of the rights of the individual and the rights of the
government. However, perhaps because of the contentious nature of
the issue of the Fifth Amendment's application to those fearing foreign
prosecution, the court seemed compelled to add an alternate theory
as to why Gecas in particular should have been allowed to invoke the
privilege.' 9  The court noted the Fourth Circuit's decision in
(Araneta)'94 and recognized that the Fourth Circuit might have
reached a different conclusion if the United States had been both the
using and the compelling sovereign.'95 The Gecas court then stated
that "even if the Fifth Amendment is only applicable to foreign
prosecutions if the United States is both in effect the compelling and
using sovereign[,] . .. Gecas nevertheless would be able to assert his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."196 . Thus, after
clarifying the balance of rights in deciding this issue,.the court ended
its holding with a pronouncement that pushed the rule back into
obscurity and will leave lower courts struggling in all but the most
similar situations. Although the court's argument is valid when applied
to Gecas' situation, 97 it may not be applicable in the vast majority of
cases, as demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in
(Araneta).'98 Thus, when a lower court is faced with a witness who
cannot claim that the United States is both the using and compelling
sovereign, the Gecas decision will leave the court in substantially the
same position it was in before Gecas. Even if the court finds that the
witness faced a real and substantial fear after assessing all the factors,
it will still be left with the possibility that the Fifth Amendment is only
192 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972) (noting the importance
of the testimony of those implicated in a crime).
193 Gecas, 50 F.3d. at 1565-66.
194 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986).
195 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1565-66; see United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920,
926 (4th Cir. 1986).
196 Id. at 1566. The court noted that the United States had entered into an agreement
with Lithuania to "affirmatively assist it in obtaining information regarding suspected Nazi
collaborators and to aid it in prosecuting these people." Therefore, the court held that the
U.S. government would be both the using and the compelling sovereign because the district
court would be instrumental in obtaining information promised by OSI to a foreign nation
for its use. Id. at 1565 (citing Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States
Department ofJustice and the Officer of the Procurator General of the Republic of Lithuania
Concerning Cooperation in the Pursuit of War Criminals, Aug. 3, 1992, U.S.-Lithuania.)
197 Id. at 1557-58. The OSI, by the nature of its.mandate, will likely be involved in the
prosecution of other alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States. Id. at 1551. Because
of this, the court's "alternate" holding, that the United States was both the using and com-
pelling sovereign, will probably apply in most of these types of cases. Id. at 1565.
198 807 F.2d at 375 (holding that petitioner could not show sufficient American
involvement simply by virtue of an agreement to provide cooperation in legal matters).
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applicable to foreign prosecutions if the United States is both the using
and compelling sovereign. 199
V. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Gecas is a valid and noble
attempt to sort through a confusing and contradictory body of law.2"'
The impact of the decision may be significant because it is the first
major decision on this issue by a federal appellate court in almost ten
years.2O' In addition, it is the first time a circuit court has come
down on the side of expanding the Fifth Amendment right to those
who fear foreign prosecution.202  Overall, the court does a laudable
job of balancing the interests of the government in compelling
testimony and the interests of the individual who fears foreign
prosecution. By concentrating on the policies and goals of the
privilege, rather than the contradictory background law, the court
presents a well-reasoned analysis for the lower courts to follow.
However, there are still flaws in the court's arguments and points that
must be expounded in order to form a truly concrete rule for this
issue. The fatal flaw of the holding is the final theory proposing that
the Fifth Amendment is only applicable to situations in which the
United States is both the using and the compelling sovereign.03
This tentative language leaves lower courts in a quandary when faced
with a situation that is not analogous to Gecas. It is not clear how
firmly the Eleventh Circuit believes that the Fifth Amendment applies
in all situations to those who have a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution, and this may result in many lower courts not easily finding
the right answer when faced with this issue.
In practical terms, the only courts bound to follow the holding in
Gecas are the lower courts of the Eleventh Circuit. Those courts may
agree or disagree privately, but in their decisions they must attempt to
dissect and abide by the Gecas court's ruling. Within other districts,
however, in particular the ones that have not addressed this issue, the
debate over whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination extends to those fearing foreign prosecution will
continue to be waged.
It is possible that with a little more attention to detail, the
199 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1566.
200 Gecas 1, 830 F. Supp. at 1414.
201 United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1986), was the last
case that actually reached the constitutional issue at the appellate court level.
202 Id. (holding that the privilege cannot be invoked by those who fear foreign
prosecution); see also United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982) (declining to
address the constitutional issue); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969) (refusing to
extend the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecution).
203 Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1566.
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Eleventh Circuit's balance of the goals and purposes behind the Fifth
Amendment might be fashioned into a rule that can meet Justice
Goldberg's view of the privilege as an embodiment of our "fundamen-
tal values and most noble aspirations. '2 4 Until that time, however,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will continue
to be "ephemeral and elude [] crisp summarization ... [,] a testament
to its profound relationship to many of our most cherished ideals.1
2 5
DEBoRA-I L. EDNEY
204 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
205 Moses v, Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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